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KEEPING THE BARBARIANS AT THE GATES:
THE PROMISE OF THE UNESCO AND
UNIDROIT CONVENTIONS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Michael P. Goodyear *

I. Introduction
Videos of Islamic State militants brutally smashing ancient statues and
carvings at ruins and museums across Iraq and Syria made headlines around
1
the world. But while this active, iconoclastic destruction made front-page
news, another form of cultural property destruction has remained in the
2
shadows: the illicit trade in cultural property. This trade removes cultural
property from its country of origin to be hidden in private collections, removing parts of a country’s history and destroying the public’s ability to enjoy and benefit from that property.
Although the danger of trafficking in cultural property can be quite ex3
treme even in highly industrialized countries, the problem is more acute in
developing countries that are rich in cultural property but poor economical4
ly. With fewer resources to dedicate to patrolling the movement of cultural
*
J.D., University of Michigan Law School (2020); A.B., University of Chicago
(2016). I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Walter E. Kaegi for nurturing
my interest in the study of Byzantine history and to the Oriental Institute at the University of
Chicago, and especially Gil Stein, for introducing me to the world of cultural heritage protection. Thank you also to my parents for entertaining and encouraging my interest in and passion for studying history and culture, as well as their enduring support throughout my law
school career. Additional thanks is due to Farshad Rahimi Dizgovin, Chloe Roddy, Annemarie Smith-Morris, and Lindsay Bernsen Wardlaw for their invaluable suggestions and comments.
1.
E.g., A. R. Williams, ISIS Smashes Priceless, Ancient Statues in Iraq, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/2/150227islamic-militants-destroy-statues-mosul-iraq-video-archaeology.
2.
See Benoit Faucon, Georgi Kantchev & Alistair MacDonald, The Men Who Trade
ISIS Loot, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2017, 7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-men-whotrade-isis-loot-1502017200.
3.
See, e.g., Sue J. Park, Note, The Cultural Property Regime in Italy: An Industrialized Source Nation’s Difficulties in Retaining and Recovering Its Antiquities, 23 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 931, 935 (1994).
4.
See PERNILLE ASKERUD & ETIENNE CLÉMENT, PREVENTING THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC
IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: A RESOURCE HANDBOOK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE
1970 UNESCO CONVENTION 10, 14, 44 (1997); Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin & Sophorn Kim,
Faked Biographies: The Remake of Antiquities and Their Sale on the Art Market, in
CULTURAL PROPERTY AND CONTESTED OWNERSHIP: THE TRAFFICKING OF ARTEFACTS AND
THE QUEST FOR RESTITUTION 108, 111 (Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin and Lyndel V. Prott eds.,
581
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property inside their borders, developing countries are at a greater risk of
5
losing that property. In addition, criminal and terrorist networks such as the
Islamic State have stolen or unearthed cultural property and then used it to
6
fund their activities. Therefore the illicit cultural property trade is an especially dangerous problem for developing countries since they often have
both large amounts of cultural property and a lack of resources to protect
7
them. While some legal scholars have suggested creating a new treaty to
8
protect cultural property in developing countries, this note instead argues
that we should first look to two existing, but underutilized, treaties on cultural property protection to create a cooperative international defense of
global cultural property.
This note proceeds as follows. After this introduction, Part II enumerates the benefits of keeping cultural property in its home state, including developing the home state’s tourism industry, preserving its national identity,
and countering criminal groups that take advantage of the illicit cultural
property trade. It then evaluates how poor economic conditions in developing countries set up a dichotomy between state and non-state actors using
cultural property for cash or development: The allure of cash is a potent
force, especially when developing countries may lack the resources at present to patrol their own borders, but, once sold, the future value of cultural
property to the local economy is lost.
Part III evaluates alternatives proposed in the literature to deal with trafficking in cultural property. Part IV then looks at how ratification of existing conventions on cultural property, namely the United Nations Education9
al, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) and the United
Nations International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
10
(“UNIDROIT”) Conventions, could offer ready solutions for protecting

2016); John Henry Merryman, What Do Matisse, Van Gogh, and Hitler Have in Common?,
U.B.C. L. REV. 273, 274 (1995).
5.
See Donna Yates, Reality and Practicality: Challenges to Effective Cultural Property Policy on the Ground in Latin America, 22 INT’L J. CULT. PROP. 337, 350 (2015).
6.
See Faucon, Kantchev & MacDonald, supra note 2.
7.
ASKERUD & CLÉMENT, supra note 4, at 9.
8.
See, e.g., Edward Cottrell, Note, Keeping the Barbarians Outside the Gate: Toward
a Comprehensive International Agreement Protecting Cultural Property, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L.
627, 648 (2009); Zsuzsanna Veres, Note, The Fight Against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural
Property: The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 12 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 91, 111–13 (2014).
9.
United Nations Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S.
231 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
10.
United Nations International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
[“UNIDROIT”] Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995,
2421 U.N.T.S. 457 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].
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the interests of developing countries by establishing market country protection obligations while limiting source country financial obligations. It reviews the Conventions’ mechanics, their benefits, and their shortcomings,
ultimately determining that the advantages of invoking the Conventions
outweigh the detriments of doing so. Part V concludes that while other alternatives do exist, the Conventions are underappreciated existing remedies
that are calibrated to help developing countries—and therefore may be a
more efficient solution to trafficking in cultural property than the invention
of a new treaty. Greater state ratification of the UNESCO and UNIDROIT
Conventions is a promising and underutilized option for developing countries to better protect their cultural property.

II. What Is the Illicit Cultural Property Trade?
In general, cultural property refers to all “movable or immovable prop12
erty of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people.” It can
include a wide range of objects, including art or artifacts, or even architec13
ture. For example, Roman floor mosaics are a form of cultural property
14
that has been sold extensively on the black market, as are the decorative
15
gold leaves stolen from an iconic roof. The illicit trade in cultural property
is the global phenomenon of selling cultural property through smuggling
16
and black markets.

11.
Market countries are those countries with the most purchasers of cultural property,
compared to source countries that are the net exporters of cultural property. The United States
is a prime example of the former and Greece and Egypt of the latter. See Carol A. Roehrenbeck, Repatriation of Cultural Property—Who Owns the Past? An Introduction to Approaches and to Selected Statutory Instruments, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 185, 189 (2010).
12.
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954 art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Hague Convention predates the UNESCO
Convention and does not provide as broad of a definition for cultural property, but it is helpful
for understanding the core spirit of the term. The full definition used by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) can be found in article 1 of
the UNESCO Convention, supra note 9.
13.
Hague Convention, supra note 12.
14.
Steve Swann, Antiquities Looted in Syria and Iraq Are Sold on Facebook, BBC
NEWS (May 2, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47628369.
15.
Golden Leaves Stolen from the Dome of Vienna’s Succession Building, ARTFORUM
(Apr. 27, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.artforum.com/news/golden-leaves-stolen-from-thedome-of-vienna-s-secession-building-75159.
16.
See generally Peter B. Campbell, The Illicit Antiquities Trade as a Transnational
Criminal Network: Characterizing and Anticipating Trafficking of Cultural Heritage, 20
INT’L J. CULT. PROP. 113 (2013) (describing the illicit antiquities market).
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A. How Has the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property Developed?
Technology and globalization have significantly contributed to the ex17
pansion of the illicit antiquities trade over the past forty years. A century
ago, international collectors were limited by financial and geographic access
18
to property and by merchants’ interest in selling such things. Today, the
scope of the cultural property trade is global, both in terms of the buyers for
19
and origins of targeted acquisitions, with complex smuggling trains allow20
ing illicit cultural property to travel far and wide. The scale of cultural
21
property crime is one of the greatest among criminal activities worldwide.
Whether it is their symbolism, history, exoticism, or simply their rarity, arti22
cles of cultural property are valued commodities and have a ready market:
23
The art and cultural property market is valued at billions of dollars a year.

17.
Neil Brodie, An Archaeologist’s View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities,
in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 52, 52 (Barbara Hoffman
ed., 2006).
18.
See, e.g., Louise Tythacott, Curiosities, Antiquities, Art Treasure, Commodities:
Collecting Chinese Deity Figures in Mid-Nineteenth-Century England, 23 J. MUSEUM
ETHNOGRAPHY 56, 65 (2010). As an additional example, around the turn of the twentieth century, elite Europeans tended to gravitate toward antiquities from classical Europe and the ancient Middle East. See Jean Sorabella, The Grand Tour, MET. MUSEUM (Oct. 2003),
https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/grtr/hd_grtr.htm (describing the fascination of young
European gentlemen with classical antiquities during the Grand Tour from the sixteenth to the
nineteenth centuries); Geoff Emberling, Passport to Antiquity, ARCHEOLOGY (July 1, 2010),
https://archive.archaeology.org/online/features/breasted (describing the Middle East collecting
tour of the United States’ first Egyptologist, James Henry Breasted, from 1919 to 1920).
19.
See, e.g., Benjamin W. Kankpeyeng & Christopher R. DeCorse, Ghana’s Vanishing
Past: Development, Antiquities, and the Destruction of the Archaeological Record, 21 AFR.
ARCHAEOLOGICAL REV. 89, 92 (2004) (citing the increased sale of antiquities to tourists,
which in turn has triggered more local looting of archaeological sites); Ralph Blumenthal &
Tom Mashberg, Officials Are Set to Seize Antiquity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/arts/design/ancient-cambodian-statue-is-seized-fromsothebys.html (describing the seizure of a stolen Cambodian statute from Sotheby’s, valued at
$2 to $3 million USD).
20.
See Campbell, supra note 16, at 116–20 (explaining that the illicit antiquities trade
involves a variety of ever-changing actors, from local diggers to sophisticated end-dealers).
See generally Donna Yates, The Global Traffic in Looted Cultural Objects, in OXFORD
RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY (2016) (analyzing the illicit cultural trafficking
chain).
21.
UNESCO Press Release, 40 Years of Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural
Goods (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/40_
years_of_fighting_the_illicit_trafficking_of_cultural_goo.
22.
See Arjo Klamer, Cultural Goods Are Good for More than Their Economic Value,
in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 138, 155–56 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds.,
2004).
23.
See Valentina Vadi & Hildegard Schneider, Art, Cultural Heritage and the Market:
Legal and Ethical Issues, in ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE MARKET: ETHICAL AND
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 8–9 (Valentina Vadi & Hildegard Schneider eds., 2014); see also UNESCO
Inst. for Statistics, International Flows of Selected Cultural Goods and Services, 1994–2003:
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And where there is a market, there are incentives to those with access to
sell.
Especially in developing countries where cultural property is not secured in guarded institutions, cultural property is readily accessible to locals, some of whom know that they can sell these artifacts and make enough
24
money to eke out a living or provide food for their families. These “subsistence diggers” typically find and sell antiquities because they see few
25
other avenues by which to improve their standard of living.
Like their citizens, states can also play a role in the loss of cultural
property: They can turn a blind eye to the sale of cultural property, be complicit in its sale, or simply not have the resources to properly protect it. Do26
mestic regulation of cultural property sales can vary wildly, although the
UNESCO Convention does require its signatories to have baseline protecDefining and Capturing the Flows of Global Cultural Trade 19–22 (2005) (describing the increase in global trade in cultural goods from $38 to $60 billion USD between 1994 and 2003).
24.
See Janet Ulph, The Trade in Art and Antiquities, in THE ILLICIT TRADE IN ART
AND ANTIQUITIES: INTERNATIONAL RECOVERY AND CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY 1, 11
(Janet Ulph & Ian Smith eds., 2012); see, e.g., Simon Mackenzie & Tess Davis, Temple Looting in Cambodia: Anatomy of a Statue Trafficking Network, 54 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 722, 729,
732 (2014) (describing the creation of military and non-military gangs inside Cambodia centered on trading Khmer artifacts); Joshua Hammer, Looting Mali’s History, SMITHSONIAN
(Nov. 2009), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/looting-malis-history-144953243 (discussing the relationship between the robust sale of antiquities in Mali—despite Malian antiquities regulations—and endemic poverty in the region).
25.
See Morag Kersel, From the Ground to the Buyer: A Market Analysis of the Trade
in Illegal Antiquities, in ARCHAEOLOGY, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE ANTIQUITIES
TRADE 188, 190, 199 (Neil Brodie et al. eds., 2006). For example, in Greece, until recently
wracked by a severe economic crisis, some people took to stealing and selling antiquities for
quick cash. Nick Romeo, Strapped for Cash, Some Greeks Turn to Ancient Source of Wealth,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 17, 2015), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/08/150817greece-looting-artifacts-financial-crisis-archaeology. Impoverished peasants in Peru have
looted sites to afford food. Nathaniel C. Nash, Poor Peru Stands By as Its Rich Past Is Plundered, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/25/world/poor-perustands-by-as-its-rich-past-is-plundered.html. Likewise, by selling antiquities, poor farmers in
Nigeria make double what they do farming yams. See Aisha Labi & Simon Robinson, Looting
Africa: Theft, Illicit Sales, Poverty and War Are Conspiring to Rob a Continent of Its Rich
Artistic Heritage, TIME (Aug. 6, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,2056125,00.html.
And although the phrase “subsistence diggers” suggests that all looting of this kind happens
on land, some happens at sea. Underwater cultural heritage is covered by the 2001 UNESCO
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage rather than the 1970
UNESCO Convention, but the same economic incentives apply. See, e.g., Mai Lin TjoaBonatz, Struggles Over Historic Shipwrecks in Indonesia: Economic Versus Preservation Interests, in CULTURAL PROPERTY AND CONTESTED OWNERSHIP: THE TRAFFICKING OF
ARTEFACTS AND THE QUEST FOR RESTITUTION 85, 87 (Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin & Lyndel
V. Prott eds., 2016) (discussing how Indonesian fishermen have strong economic incentives to
recover and sell cultural heritage recovered from shipwrecks).
26.
For example, Europe is considered to have less stringent requirements for proving
provenance than the United States. See William G. Pearlstein, Buying and Selling Antiquities
in Today’s Market, SPENCER’S ART L.J., Spring 2012.
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27

tions in their domestic regulations. But because the crime of selling cultural property usually requires the property to leave its home country, it is necessary to not just have domestic regulation, but international regulation that
can lead to the recovery of cultural property once it has left its home country. Some regulatory protections of this kind can be found in bilateral
28
29
agreements and the restrictions of importing countries. Additional forms
of international protection will be addressed in Part IV.

B. Why Should a Country Protect Its Cultural Property?
Although state and non-state actors in source countries might benefit
from selling pieces of their cultural property, these benefits tend to be shortterm and superficial. The local community as a whole barely benefits from
the sale of a state’s cultural property. In fact, in many cases, the local seller
of an artifact only receives less than one percent of its retail value, with
30
most of the profit going to middlemen in the trade. Moreover, the antiquities market is not sustainable. Unlike other aspects of cultural heritage, such
as traditional craftsmanship techniques that can be preserved and furthered
31
through the creation of cultural heritage-based industries, once physical
properties are gone, their home countries are left without that resource for
future economic development. Lastly, the cash generated by the sale of cultural property often goes to criminals or military warlords, rather than into
32
the local economy.
In contrast, the retention of cultural property can spur economic growth
through tourism, provide a sense of cultural identity, and dry up a funding
source for extremists and criminal groups.

27.
See UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, arts. 5–10, 13–14.
28.
See, e.g., Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Property, May 21, 1984, U.S.-Guatemala, T.I.A.S. No 11077 (the parties
agreed, inter alia, “to deter illicit excavations of archaeological sites and the theft of archaeological, historical or cultural properties”); Treaty of Cooperation Providing for the Recovery
and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, U.S.Mexico, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088 (using the same language).
29.
See Pearlstein, supra note 26 (noting differing restriction standards in, for example,
the United States and Europe).
30.
Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 378 (1995).
31.
See generally Ummu Hani et al., Preserving Cultural Heritage Through Creative
Industry: A Lesson from Saung Angklung, 4 PROCEDIA ECON. & FIN. 193 (2012) (analyzing
the Saung Angklung Udjo, a one-stop cultural workshop that includes handicrafts from local
craftsman, as an example of a successful creative industry preserving Sudanese cultural heritage).
32.
See, e.g., Heather Pringle, ISIS Cashing in on Looted Antiquities to Fuel Iraq Insurgency, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 27, 2014), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2014/6/140626-isis-insurgents-syria-iraq-looting-antiquities-archaeology; ISIL and Antiquities
Trafficking, F.B.I. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/isil-and-antiquitiestrafficking.
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1. Sustainable Economic Development
Cultural property can be the key for developing countries to break into
one of the largest global economic sectors: tourism. Tourism is a major
component of economies around the world, generating over $7.6 trillion
33
USD in 2016 (10.2% of the global GDP). To get a share of that wealth,
34
towns across the globe, from major tourist destinations to unfamiliar lo35
cales, are adopting new strategies to increase their appeal to tourists. Tourism has proved particularly critical to a number of emerging economies. For
example, in 2016 tourism contributed $152.2 billion USD to the Brazilian
36
economy (8.5% of the GDP), $12.5 billion USD to the Croatian economy
37
38
(24.7%), and $19 billion USD to the Moroccan economy (18.5%). In all
three countries, the tourism industry provides hundreds of thousands of
39
jobs.
Selling off cultural property would undermine the future of such tourism in many developing countries. Cultural heritage is a significant draw for
40
tourists, and “cultural tours” have become an increasingly formalized sell41
ing point for travelers. If cultural artifacts are on display at a museum or
archaeological site inside the country, they can and do attract tourists and
42
help to build a tourism economy. Indeed, cultural and heritage tourists tend
to stay in a host country longer and spend more money there than other
33.
WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL & TOURISM: ECONOMIC IMPACT
& ISSUES 2017, 1 (2017).
34.
See, e.g., LONDON & PARTNERS, A Tourism Vision for London (2017),
http://files.londonandpartners.com/l-and-p/assets/london_tourism_vision_aug_2017.pdf (describing recent developments in London’s tourism economy).
35.
See, e.g., Maylis Bellocq, Le Patrimoine Culturel Comme Resource Touristique: Le
Bourg Ancient de Tongli, Province du Jiangsu, 46 L’ESPACE GÉOGRAPHIQUE 346 (2017) (describing the developments in the tourism economy of the Chinese town of Tongli since the
1980s).
36.
WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL & TOURISM: ECONOMIC IMPACT
2017 BRAZIL, 1 (2017), https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impactresearch/countries-2017/brazil2017.pdf [hereinafter TRAVEL & TOURISM: BRAZIL].
37.
WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL & TOURISM: ECONOMIC IMPACT
2017 CROATIA, 1 (2017), https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impactresearch/countries-2017/croatia2017.pdf [hereinafter TRAVEL & TOURISM: CROATIA].
38.
WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL & TOURISM: ECONOMIC IMPACT
2017 MOROCCO, 1 (2017), https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impactresearch/countries-2017/morocco2017.pdf [hereinafter TRAVEL & TOURISM: MOROCCO].
39.
TRAVEL & TOURISM: BRAZIL, supra note 36, at 1; TRAVEL & TOURISM: CROATIA,
supra note 37, at 1; TRAVEL & TOURISM: MOROCCO, supra note 38, at 1.
40.
DALLEN J. TIMOTHY, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND TOURISM: AN INTRODUCTION 1–
2 (2011); Ismaiel Naser Abuamoud et al., Factors Affecting the Willingness of Tourists to Visit Cultural Heritage Sites in Jordan, 9 J. HERITAGE TOURISM 148, 149 (2014).
41.
See, e.g., Niall Finneran, Lucy to Lalibela: Heritage and Identity in Ethiopia in the
Twenty-First Century, 19 INT’L J. HERITAGE STUDIES 41, 45 (2013).
42.
NEIL BRODIE ET AL., STEALING HISTORY: THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL
MATERIAL 14 (2000).
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43

types of tourists. As it brings money into countries, the tourism industry
44
also creates a significant number of jobs. Tourism, and cultural property as
a driver of tourism, can thus serve as a significant economic vehicle for development.
Although many developing countries lack the internal resources to
45
properly preserve and display their cultural property, international funding
46
and expertise tend to be available for these purposes across the globe.
47
While the total amount of funds available is still less than may be optimal,
there are a variety of financial resources developing countries can engage to
48
fund cultural property preservation, including intergovernmental funds,
49
philanthropic foundations, and individual donors that have often not yet
50
been fully tapped. For example, Cambodia received between $10 and $20
million USD in international investment and management consulting from
51
the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) and UNESCO.
These funds helped Cambodia preserve the historic ruins of Angkor and develop a cultural tourism industry that now generates over one billion dollars

43.
See PACIFIC ASIA TRAVEL ASSOCIATION, THE ROLE OF CULTURE AND HERITAGE
TOURISM IN BUILDING THE VISITOR ECONOMY—AND BEYOND 1 (Apr. 2015).
44.
See WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 2.
45.
See MICHAEL M. AMES, CANNIBAL TOURS AND GLASS BOXES: THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF MUSEUMS xv (1992) (stating that some developing countries like India
may not be able to afford as many museums as is desirable to accommodate their growing
populations and extensive histories).
46.
See e.g., THE WORLD BANK: URBAN DEV. SERIES, THE ECONOMICS OF
UNIQUENESS: INVESTING IN HISTORIC CITY CORES AND CULTURAL HERITAGE ASSETS FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT xxvii (Guido Licciardi & Rana Amirtahmasebi eds., 2012);
David Throsby, Investment in Urban Heritage: Economic Impacts of Cultural Heritage Projects in Macedonia and Georgia, 16 WORLD BANK 15, 20–21 (2012),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/3363871169585750379/UDS16_Investment+in+Urban+Heritage.pdf (discussing the variety of outside investments utilized in restoring sections of old Skopje, Macedonia).
47.
Guy Clausse, Funding Sources for Preserving Cultural Heritage Monuments and
Sites, EUR. INV. BANK INST. (Nov. 25, 2013).
48.
See, e.g., International Funds Supporting Culture, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/
protecting-pour-heritage-and-fostering-creativity/international/funds/supporting/culture (last
visited Apr. 24, 2020).
49.
See, e.g., Grants Database: University of Pretoria Arts and Cultural Heritage Program, MELLON FOUNDATION, https://mellon.org/grants/grants-database/grants/university-ofpretoria/31700645 (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
50.
See, e.g., About Donors, INT’L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESERVATION AND
RESTORATION OF CULT. PROP., https://www.iccrom.org/about/funding/donors (last visited
Apr. 24, 2020).
51.
GLOBAL HERITAGE FUND, SAVING OUR VANISHING HERITAGE: SAFEGUARDING
ENDANGERED CULTURAL HERITAGE SITES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 37 (2010).
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52

USD in revenue annually. The World Bank also regularly provides finan53
54
cial assistance for protecting cultural property, as do non-profits.

2. National Identity
The loss of cultural property can inflict a much deeper wound to a
country than just to its economy. A country’s cultural property embodies the
55
physical manifestation of its identity, history, and culture. As such, it
forms an essential element of the country’s national and historic identity.
The loss of archaeological remains leads to the loss of a people’s heritage
56
and history. For example, the loss of the Elgin Marbles, friezes that originally adorned the Parthenon in Athens but which were transported to Britain
and placed in the British museum in the early 1800s, continues to be widely
57
mourned by Greeks as a loss of national identity.
It follows that cultural property can be a key component of education
58
about one’s heritage. Making this connection, Irina Bokova, the former Director-General of UNESCO, has opined that the illicit trade in cultural property is “seriously detrimental, and often irreversibly so, to the collective
59
memory, social cohesion, and mutual enrichment [of a nation].” Cultural
property can also be critical in unifying a nation and creating political and

52.
Id.
53.
See, e.g., LB—Cultural Heritage Add. Financing, WORLD BANK,
http://projects.worldbank.org/P116197/lb-cultural-heritage-add-financing?lang=en (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (providing funding for the preservation of Lebanon’s built cultural heritage); Cultural Heritage Pilot Program, WORLD BANK, http://projects.worldbank.org/
P059763/cultural-heritage-pilot-project?lang=en (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (providing funding for the reconstruction of Old Mostar Bridge and the historic district of Mostar in Bosnia
and Herzegovina); Cultural Heritage Preservation Project, WORLD BANK,
http://projects.worldbank.org/P058969/cultural-heritage-preservation-project?lang=en
(last
visited Apr. 24, 2020) (providing funding for the conservation of four priority cultural heritage sites in Azerbaijan and for training restoration workers).
HERITAGE
FUND,
54.
See,
e.g.,
Projects
and
Programs,
GLOBAL
https://globalheritagefund.org/what-we-do/projects-and-programs (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
55.
Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 562–65 (1995).
56.
BRODIE, DOOLE & WATSON, supra note 42, at 12–13.
57.
As Melina Mercouri, former Greek Minister of Culture, put it, “This is our history,
this is our soul.” S.F. CHRON. (May 26, 1983), at 26 (speaking about the Elgin Marbles).
58.
See, e.g., Nicole Gesche-Koning, Research for CULT Committee—Education in
Cultural Heritage, POLICY DEPT. FOR STRUCTURAL & COHESION POLICIES, EUR.
PARLIAMENT 15–16 (2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/
617486/IPOL_STU(2018)617486_EN.pdf (describing the importance of heritage education in
the context of Europe).
59.
Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO, 40th Anniversary of the 1970 Convention (Mar. 15, 2011) (transcript available in the UNESDOC Digital Library).

590

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 41:581

social bonds among its peoples through a shared understanding of their col60
lective past.
Accordingly, maintaining cultural property inside a country may help
61
that country craft its own historical narrative. Across the globe, cultural
heritage preservation has been an essential tool in maintaining a nation’s internal image. For example, Balkan countries used surviving historical narratives and remnants of cultural property from medieval times to craft a national narrative of independence based on the opposition of their former
medieval kingdoms to the yoke of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth
62
century. To reinforce a sense of continuity with its longstanding Christian
tradition, Ethiopia promoted the churches of Lalibela, perhaps the most
iconic of Ethiopia’s medieval churches, through media and political rheto63
ric. Meanwhile, Mexico has long used protective policies such as preservation of its cultural sites (e.g., Chichen Itza and Monte Albán) and the commission of monuments to its indigenous cultural heritage (e.g., the
Monument to Cuauhtémoc in Mexico City) to encourage connections with
its pre-Hispanic past and its indigenous peoples, such as the Aztecs, Ma64
yans, and Zapotecs.
In contrast, a lack of connection to cultural identity can be harmful on a
65
66
personal and societal level, and the lack of a cohesive cultural narrative
67
can be especially powerful in post-colonial contexts. For example, the cultures of the Maasai of Kenya and the Himbas of Namibia have often been
portrayed in a distorted colonized context, which can be determinative of
how Kenyans and Namibians, as well as the outside world, see these peo68
ples. As education professors Ladislaus Semali and Tutalni Asino put it,

60.
See Gustavo de las Casas, Is Nationalism Good for You?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 8,
2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/08/is-nationalism-good-for-you.
61.
This is especially true when a country’s cultural property was inaccessible for a
long period of its history and has only recently been rediscovered.
62.
RYAN GINGERAS, FALL OF THE SULTANATE: THE GREAT WAR AND THE END OF
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 75–76 (2016).
63.
Finneran, supra note 41, at 43–44, 53–54.
64.
See Aztec and Maya Revival: Gallery Guide, MEXIC-ARTE MUSEUM (2008),
http://www.mexic-artemuseum.org/images/uploads/education/Aztec_and_Maya_Revival_
Guide.pdf.
65.
See FARAH IBRAHIM & JIANNA HEUER, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
COUNSELING 15 (Anthony Marsella ed., 2016).
66.
See, e.g., E. O. Wahab et al., Causes and Consequences of Rapid Erosion of Cultural Values in a Traditional African Society, 2012 J. ANTHROPOLOGY 6 (Feb. 2012) (study of
the Awori people of Ado-Odo).
67.
See Finneran, supra note 41, at 43.
68.
Ladislaus M. Semali & Tutaleni I. Asino, Decolonizing Cultural Heritage of Indigenous People’s Knowledge from Images in Global Films, 2 DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY,
EDUC. & SOC’Y 25, 26–27, 32–33 (2013).
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anthropologists’ interest in developing their portrayals of these peoples
69
“was in the ‘other,’ not the ‘self.’”
The disappearance of a country’s cultural property, or the assignment of
70
an otherized meaning to it, only contributes to the fracturing or loss of a
people’s narrative. Instead, cultural property can and should be harnessed to
create local counter narratives, as it has been in the Balkans, Ethiopia, and
71
Mexico.
On the other hand, before those narratives are embedded in the local
psyche, a major reason for the looting of cultural property is the fact that local residents often feel no real connection with the antiquities that surround
72
them, which contributes to a willingness to sell off cultural property as a
73
living. Yet cultural property is essential in “tell[ing] us who we are and
74
75
where we came from.” It is the memory of a society. And the cultural
identity it creates can also be essential in connecting disparate peoples, in
turn helping to generate wealth, maintain political stability, and lower
76
crime.

3. Countering Extremist Groups and Crime
77

The sale of cultural property usually lines criminals’ pockets, and a
state’s maintenance of its cultural property can therefore help to dry up a
funding source for criminals and terrorists. Although the exact relationship
between the illicit trade in cultural property and terrorism is still being debated, the sale of cultural property provides clear opportunities for extremist

69.
Id. at 35.
70.
See John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 339, 342–43 (1989).
71.
See Semali & Asino, supra note 68, at 28.
72.
See, e.g., ROGER ATWOOD, STEALING HISTORY: TOMB RAIDERS, SMUGGLERS,
AND THE LOOTING OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 57–58 (2004) (describing how the historical
movements of people in Peru led to current locals having no connection to the historical inhabitants of those areas); SHARON WAXMAN, LOOT: THE BATTLE OVER STOLEN TREASURES
OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 142 (2008) (explaining that the modern residents of Turkey have no
direct link with the ancient civilizations that once existed there); Tom Mueller, How
Tomb Raiders Are Stealing Our History, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 2016),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/06/looting-ancient-blood-antiquities
(discussing how local Egyptian populations often feel no connection to the ancient artifacts
they sell).
73.
See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 72.
74.
Albert Elsen, Introduction: Why Do We Care About Art?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951,
952 (1976).
75.
Merryman, supra note 70.
76.
See de las Casas, supra note 60.
77.
See generally Jessica Dietzler, On ‘Organized Crime’ in Illicit Antiquities Trade:
Moving Beyond the Definitional Debate, 16 TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME 329 (2013).

592

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 41:581

78

groups to exploit. For example, the Islamic State made millions of dollars
79
from the illicit sale of antiquities to fuel its insurgency in Syria and Iraq. It
took full advantage of the global demand for cultural property—both on the
black market and on online platforms such as eBay and Facebook—to fund
not only its caliphate, but also devastating terrorist attacks across the
80
globe. The sale and destruction of cultural property has also been used as
propaganda by terrorist groups such as the Ansar Dine in Mali and the Tali81
ban in Afghanistan.
Even where the cultural property trade has not been linked to an outright insurgency, it has frequently been linked to organized criminal net82
works such as gangs and local warlords. Indeed, there is often a connec83
tion between the illicit cultural property trade and organized crime.
Although media has tended to misleadingly focus on the illicit antiquities
trade within international criminal networks, the presence of organized domestic crime, such as armed paramilitary groups in Cambodia in the last
84
85
decades of the twentieth century, is almost always a factor. Even when
some aspect of the cultural property trade is legal, its lucrative nature tends
to drive a lack of accountability between the government and the people, an

78.
See RUSSELL D. HOWARD, MARC D. ELLIOTT & JONATHAN R. PROHOV, IS AND
CULTURAL GENOCIDE: ANTIQUITIES TRAFFICKING IN THE TERRORIST STATE 14–16 (2016).
79.
Pringle, supra note 32; see also ISIL and Antiquities Trafficking, supra note 32.
80.
Fiona Rose-Greenland, How Much Money Has ISIS Made Selling Antiquities?
More Than Enough to Fund Its Attacks, WASH. POST (June 3, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/03/how-much-money-has-isismade-selling-antiquities-more-than-enough-to-fund-its-attacks; see also Sangwon Yoon, Islamic State Is Selling Looted Art Online for Needed Cash, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-28/isis-has-new-cash-cow-art-loot-it-speddling-on-ebay-facebook.
81.
Irina Bokova, Timbuktu Tomb Attack Is an Attack on Our Humanity, CNN (July 4,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/02/opinion/unesco-mali-opinion; Luke Harding, Taliban
Blow Apart 2,000 Years of Buddhist History, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2001),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/03/afghanistan.lukeharding; Lydia Polgreen,
As Extremists Invaded, Timbuktu Hid Artifacts of a Golden Age, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/world/africa/saving-timbuktus-priceless-artifacts-frommilitants-clutches.html.
82.
See, e.g., Mackenzie & Davis, supra note 24, at 729, 732 (discussing the northwest
smuggling channel out of Cambodia, including the regional brokers and organized criminals
who purchased from the brokers).
83.
Greg Borgstede, Cultural Property, the Palermo Convention, and Transnational
Organized Crime, 20 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 281, 285 (2014).
84.
These groups actively looted cultural property complexes. Mackenzie & Davis, supra note 24, at 730.
85.
Blythe Bowman Proulx, Organized Criminal Involvement in the Illicit Antiquities
Trade, 14 TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME 1, 17, 24 (Oct. 2010). That is, organized domestic
criminals can and do sell cultural property internationally, too.
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exacerbation of disparities in wealth, and even wars over access to cultural
86
property.
87
Terrorism and related acts undermine democratic rule. Organized
88
crime kills just as many people as armed conflicts each year. The profitable existence of terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups is starkly opposed
to a country’s interest in rule of law and stability. Therefore, it is in countries’ security interests to prevent the use of cultural property as a vehicle
for funding extremist groups and local criminal organizations.

C. Reasons for a Country’s Inability or Unwillingness to
Protect Its Cultural Property
There are clear benefits to preserving a country’s cultural property. Yet
the major problem for many developing countries is not a lack of willpower,
but a lack of the finances necessary to prevent cultural property from leaving.
Other, more pressing crimes often draw scant resources away from the
89
protection of cultural property, and there is a general lack of funds to pro90
tect archaeological sites. Developing countries frequently do not have the
91
budget to enforce cultural property laws or protect existing treasures, let
92
alone to prevent the smuggling of newly unearthed artifacts. For example,
India spends less than 1% of its budget on culture, much less than countries
such as France and the United Kingdom, resulting in poor maintenance of
93
its existing museums.
86.
See Stewart M. Patrick, Why Natural Resources Are a Curse on Developing Countries and How to Fix It, ATLANTIC (Apr. 30, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2012/04/why-natural-resources-are-a-curse-on-developing-countries-and-how-to-fixit/256508 (noting these issues for countries rich in natural resources, whose trade raises issues
similar issues to those in the trade of cultural property).
87.
Daniel L. Byman, How Terrorism Undermines Democracy, BROOKINGS
(Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/05/how-terrorismundermines-democracy.
88.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide: Executive
Summary,
at 12
(2019), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/
Booklet1.pdf.
89.
Borodkin, supra note 30, at 384.
90.
See MICHAEL M. AMES, CANNIBAL TOURS AND GLASS BOXES: THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF MUSEUMS xv (1992) (stating that some developing countries like India
may not be able to afford as many museums as is desirable to accommodate their growing
populations and extensive histories); see also Borodkin, supra note 30, at 384.
91.
See James Ede, Ethics, the Antiquities Trade, and Archaeology, 7 INT’L J.
CULTURAL PROPERTY 128, 128 (1998) (“[L]ess money is available in artifact-rich nations,
many of which are developing countries, for the conservation and security of national collections.”).
92.
See Park, supra note 3, at 934 (speaking generally about developing countries).
93.
Maria Thomas, A Fading Taj and Shabby Museums, QUARTZ INDIA (Jan. 29,
2017), https://qz.com/india/897228/a-fading-taj-and-shabby-museums-india-spends-less-than1-of-its-annual-budget-on-culture-and-it-shows.
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The lack of funds to staff guards, in particular, has led to thefts of artifacts from museums and archaeological sites in developing countries. For
example, in the wake of the Arab Spring, the number of guards provided by
the Egyptian government to protect archaeological sites plummeted, as did
94
the pay, which was not even enough to support a single person. Looting
95
followed.
A related issue is the lack of a skilled workforce and of the technological capabilities to implement modern security measures. Modern collections
should, as a best practice, be electronically documented to facilitate audits
of their contents, which is difficult if there is not proper technical exper96
tise. Other best practices adopted by the Cultural Properties Council of
ASIS International and the American Alliance of Museums for museum security include electronic key card access and electronic intrusion detection
97
systems, which, in addition to their cost, also require expertise to install
and maintain.
It is, naturally, even more difficult to have effective security measures
in the case of yet undiscovered cultural property. Since this cultural property
has not been discovered, it has no chance to be electronically documented as
national cultural property, which makes it more difficult for countries to de98
termine whether a loss has occurred or to find the property in the future.
There is also an enforcement problem among importing countries, at least in
the United States, since to prevent an import the government must prove
that the cultural property was stolen, which is near impossible for a recent
99
discovery with no documentation. The Islamic State has used this dilemma
to great effect, encouraging subsistence digging to uncover new artifacts
that it can sell more easily with no available documentation on the black
100
market.
Note, however, that even if the funding and expertise did exist to better
guard museums and archaeological sites from casual theft, crime networks

94.
Salima Ikram, The Loss and Looting of Egyptian Antiquities, MIDDLE EAST INST.
(Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.mei.edu/publications/loss-and-looting-egyptian-antiquities.
95.
Id.
96.
See Davison Chiwara, Documentation: A Security Tool for the Identification and
Repatriation of Illicitly Trafficked Objects from Museums with Particular Reference to the
National Gallery of Zimbabwe, 2 HERITAGE 390, 398 (2019).
97.
CULTURAL PROPERTIES COUNCIL OF ASIS INTERNATIONAL, Suggested Practices
for Museum Collections Space Security (2013), https://www.aam-us.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/01/suggested-practices-for-museum-collections-space-security.pdf.
98.
See Rachel Shabi, Looted in Syria—and Sold in London: The British Antiques
Shops Dealing in Artefacts Smuggled by ISIS, GUARDIAN (July 3, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/03/antiquities-looted-by-isis-end-up-in-londonshops.
99.
See Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities: Reducing the Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 179 (2007).
100.
Shabi, supra note 98.
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and semi-autonomous groups often have the power to resist enforcement.
Likewise, while a museum may be secure in a stable country, during periods
of civil unrest, the ability for cultural property to leave the country increas102
es. When security forces have their attention drawn to protests or uprisings or outright war, there is often lower cultural property protection, as in
103
Syria due to its ongoing civil war. Perhaps the best-known example of this
phenomenon is the looting of the Iraq Museum in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which resulted in thousands of artifacts disappearing,
104
including the famous Warka vase of ancient Sumer.

III. Alternatives for Protecting Cultural Property
Currently, there are two primary peacetime multilateral agreements on
cultural property, detailed in more depth in Part IV: the UNESCO Conven105
tion and the UNIDROIT Convention. Nevertheless, cultural property theft
is still a large problem, and both Conventions have faced criticisms for their
106
shortcomings. Consequently, to rectify the international legal system’s
apparently inadequate cultural property protections, scholars have suggested
abolition of the Conventions, creation of a third convention to overcome
107
these shortcomings, or other alternatives. But while these proposals may
have some merit, they ignore the benefits the existing Conventions would
provide if they achieved greater ratification. As a result, this note suggests
that the international community’s primary focus should be on securing
broader ratification of those agreements.

A. Destruction of the Two Conventions or a New Convention
Two suggestions that have gained traction for better protecting cultural
property are to abolish the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions or to institute a third cultural property convention that supplements the current two.

101.
See Borgstede, supra note 83, at 285; see also Mackenzie & Davis, supra note 24,
at 729, 732 (describing the workings of one criminal smuggling network in Cambodia).
102.
See, e.g., Clemens D. Reichel, Lost Treasures from Iraq, in ORIENTAL INSTITUTE
ANNUAL REPORT: 2004–05 74 (Gil J. Stein ed., 2005).
103.
See Christina Steenkamp, The Crime-Conflict Nexus and the Civil War in Syria, 6
STABILITY: INT’L J. SECURITY & DEV. 1, 8 (2017).
104.
See generally CATASTROPHE! THE LOOTING AND DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ’S PAST
(Geoff Emberling & Katharyn Hanson eds., 2008).
105.
Veres, supra note 8, at 93. There is also the Hague Convention, which covers the
protection of cultural property during international war. It has 133 States Parties but only restricts the actions of state signatories (and only when they are at war with each other). Hague
Convention, supra note 12, at 254. Non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State
cannot be signatories and are not covered by it. See id.
106.
See, e.g., John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 ENVIRONS 1, 8 (2004).
107.
See infra Part III.A and III.B.
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It is indeed true that the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions are fallible. But are they flawed enough to pass over entirely? Furthermore, would
it even be possible to create a new treaty?
Jeanette Greenfield’s criticisms of the UNESCO Convention in 1996
still largely hold true: The Convention only covers recorded cultural property, the scope of its protection is unclear, restitution under the Convention
can take years, and there are no formal means to resolve disputes between
108
States Parties. Eric Posner has argued that the UNESCO Convention has
failed to erode the black market in illicit antiquities, and the entire regime
109
should be abolished. Yet there have been successful returns of cultural
110
property under the UNESCO Convention. Indeed, the UNESCO Convention was the primary vehicle used to recover hundreds of stolen artifacts in
111
the last two years. Hence, even though enforcement is not perfect, the
UNESCO Convention has had, as will be detailed below, some positive ef112
fects. Even some effect is better than none.
Other articles have advocated instead for the creation of a third agreement that would solve the shortcomings of the UNESCO and UNIDROIT
Conventions. Zsuzsanna Veres advocates for an agreement that better com113
promises between the needs of source and market countries, and Edward
Cottrell argues for an agreement that creates a specialized dispute resolution
114
body. But creating a new cultural property convention would require exactly the kind of compromise that these critics believe renders the existing
treaties insufficient: To gain market country signatories, a new convention
will have to pander to their interests, just as, in a compromise with market
country signatories over the creation of a restitution mechanism lacking in
the UNESCO Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention places more of the
burdens and costs of litigation on source countries, as discussed below.
It is also important to note that many of the weaknesses of the
UNESCO Convention were meant to be countered by the UNIDROIT Convention. Posner disregards the important fact that the UNIDROIT Convention operates in conjunction with the UNESCO Convention. Veres and Edward Cottrell do address the UNIDROIT Convention but move on to their

108.
JEANETTE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 258–60 (2d ed.
1996).
109.
See Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 214–15, 218, 228–30 (2007).
110.
See Recent Restitution Cases of Cultural Objects Using the 1970 Convention,
UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-culturalproperty/recent-restitution-cases-of-cultural-objects-using-the-1970-convention (last visited
Apr. 24, 2020).
111.
See e.g., id. (indicating that in seven instances, parties acquired restitution for a total of hundreds of cultural objects in 2018 and 2019).
112.
See infra Part IV.B.
113.
Veres, supra note 8, at 111–13.
114.
Cottrell, supra note 8, at 653–55.
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proposed additions rather than analyzing the particular benefits the Conven115
tion already has for developing countries. Unlike these earlier scholars,
this note suggests that an adequate protection of cultural property depends
upon states adhering to both Conventions, as the UNIDROIT Convention
was meant to rectify many of the shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention.
This is not to say that the combination of the two Conventions is a perfect solution. The UNIDROIT Convention does place more burdens and
116
costs on source countries to litigate their claims, as discussed below, and
117
it is severely undermined by the low number of signatories. However, to
get market countries to agree to the UNIDROIT Convention, it was necessary to split the costs to some degree. A compromise was necessary to create a proper restitution mechanism, which the UNESCO Convention lacked.
Creating a new cultural property convention would require a similar
compromise. In contrast, it is a remarkably good deal for source countries
that practically every major market country has already signed onto the
UNESCO Convention and that a number of them, including China, France,
118
and Spain, have signed onto the UNIDROIT Convention as well. It is possible to draft a new cultural property treaty that creates an international arbitration process for the restitution of cultural property, one that places greater
obligations on market countries, and that establishes penalties for not com119
plying with the articles of the convention, but the odds of such a convention being accepted by the community of nations are low without significant
120
compromises from source countries.
In any case, important as these suggestions may be, they skip the question of whether the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions, as they currently stand, offer enough benefits for developing countries to become States
121
Parties. Indeed, there is no reason why a third convention, if it could be
adopted, could not work in coordination with the already existing UNESCO
and UNIDROIT Conventions, which are readily available for ratification
now. The prospect of an even better convention does not remove the availa-

115.
See Veres, supra note 8, at 100–02; Cottrell, supra note 8, at 631–39.
116.
See infra Part IV.F.
117.
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome,
1995)—Status, UNIDROIT, https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last updated Dec. 2, 2019)
(fifty-eight states have signed the Convention and only forty-eight have implemented it).
118.
Id.
119.
See, e.g., Cottrell, supra note 8, at 648; Veres, supra note 8, at 111–13 (both suggesting new international treaties to protect cultural property).
120.
See Cottrell, supra note 8, at 657.
121.
Though Veres and Cottrell do address the UNIDROIT Convention, they do not do
so in any analytical depth; they move directly on to their proposed additions rather than analyze the particular benefits for developing countries. See Veres, supra note 8, at 100–02; Cottrell, supra note 8, at 631–39.
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bility of using currently available ones, especially since they provide significant benefits to developing countries.

B. Other Alternatives
Instead of crafting a new convention, one scholar has suggested using
another existing international treaty, the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime (“UNTOC”), to fill gaps in the UNESCO
122
and UNIDROIT Conventions. Some others have even proposed that
source countries sell off their cultural property through a state auction sys123
tem.
Greg Borgstede describes how UNTOC could be used to protect cultur124
al property. Notably, though UNTOC can help enforce the protection of
cultural property, it does not explicitly address cultural property in the same
detail as the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions. Its lack of specificity
allows for varying interpretations by different states. Borgstede explains that
one of the best reasons to use UNTOC as a tool for cultural property protec125
tion is this convention’s broad membership network. Yet one may achieve
the same advantage by increasing ratification of the UNESCO and
UNIDROIT Conventions. Of course, fully employing the UNESCO and
126
UNIDROIT Conventions does not mean that UNTOC cannot be used too.
Instead, they could be used as complementary methods; but moving straight
to UNTOC while ignoring UNESCO and UNIDROIT leaves substantial
benefits for developing countries on the table.
Alternatively, Lisa Borodkin has suggested that countries publicly auction off their cultural property and create a regulated market instead of an
127
illicit one. This solution would offer the benefit of directly undercutting
the illicit market and its associated ills by creating a new, legally regulated
128
market, and it has been suggested for other illegal activities that have
connections to associated crime, such as the sale and consumption of mari129
juana. This solution is problematic, however, in that it only addresses the
state’s desire to cut off the criminal funding provided by theft of cultural

122.
Cf. Borgstede, supra note 83, at 284.
123.
Borodkin, supra note 30, at 411–16.
124.
Borgstede, supra note 83, at 285.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 286. (acknowledging that the focus on the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime may detract from the UNESCO and UNIDROIT
Conventions).
127.
See e.g., Borodkin, supra note 30, at 411–16.
128.
Id. at 412.
129.
See, e.g., Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, 23
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99, 111–14 (2018).
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property, disregarding the benefits a state receives from maintaining its cul130
tural property, as discussed above.

IV. International Law Protections: UNESCO Convention and
UNIDROIT Convention
In sum, the existing scholarship provides creative solutions, but it has
overlooked the benefits provided by the existing UNESCO and UNIDROIT
Conventions. Increasing the number of parties to the UNESCO and
UNIDROIT Conventions could bring untapped international support to
countries trying to maintain their cultural property. This part will discuss the
legal requirements and remedies, benefits for developing countries, and
shortcomings of the UNESCO and the UNIDROIT Conventions. While the
UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions are undersubscribed by source
countries and there are valid shortcomings in both treaties, this part concludes that they provide substantial benefits to developing countries and
therefore suggests that international protection of cultural property would be
enhanced if developing countries sign onto the UNESCO and UNIDROIT
Conventions as they currently stand.

A. UNESCO Convention Overview
UNESCO established the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
131
Property in 1970. The States Parties to the UNESCO Convention recognize that the illicit transfer of cultural property from countries impoverishes
their cultural heritage and that international cooperation is the best defense
132
against such losses.
By agreeing to the UNESCO Convention, States Parties undertake to
133
oppose the illicit trade of cultural property. This obligation cuts both
ways: States Parties must take steps both to prevent the exportation of their
own cultural property and to prevent the importation of cultural property
134
from other countries. The obligation to prevent unlawful exportation requires a State Party to set up a national service dedicated to the protection of
135
cultural heritage. This national service drafts laws and regulations to protect cultural property, maintains a list of known national cultural property,
130.
See supra Part II.B.
131.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 9.
132.
Id. art. 2(1).
133.
Id. art. 2(2). A State Party to a treaty “is a country that has ratified or acceded to
that particular treaty, and is therefore legally bound by the provisions in the instrument.” Introduction to the Convention of the Rights of the Child: Definition of Key Terms Used in the
UN Treaty Collection, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/french/crc/files/Definitions.pdf (last
visited Apr. 24, 2020).
134.
See UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 3.
135.
Id. art. 5
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and promotes the institutional preservation and presentation of cultural
136
property. It also is responsible for organizing excavations, establishing
ethical rules for dealers and curators in accordance with the Convention,
taking steps to develop respect for all cultural heritages, and publicizing the
137
disappearance of any cultural property. To prevent unlawful exportation a
138
State Party is obliged to certify lawful exportations of cultural property.
States Parties also have a duty to prevent the importation of illegal cul139
tural property from other States Parties, particularly cultural property stolen from another State Party’s museums, religious or secular monuments,
140
and similar sites. Notably, this duty only applies to imports from other
141
States Parties, not from all countries. As part of this requirement, a State
Party must ban its museums and similar institutions from acquiring new cultural property illicitly taken from another State Party and must inform the
142
country of origin if such property is recovered. A State Party may also request that another State Party take steps to recover and return improperlyacquired cultural property imported after the Convention was implemented
143
in both States. A State Party may even send a general request to other
States Parties to protect its cultural property if that property is in jeopardy of
being pillaged, and responding countries must act in concert with the requesting nation to “determine and carry out concrete measures,” including
taking provisional measures to prevent irreparable damage to the cultural
144
property in question. Moreover, a State Party must comply with another
State Party’s classification of its cultural property as inalienable for import
145
purposes. This means that a State Party can declare what constitutes cultural property under the ambit of the Convention’s protections and declare
that any, or even all, of its cultural property cannot be legally removed from
within its borders, and importing countries must refuse to admit that proper146
ty in response.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id. art. 6.
139.
Id. art. 7.
140.
Id. art. 7(b)(i).
141.
See id.
142.
Id. art. 7(a).
143.
Id. art. 7(b)(ii).
144.
Id. art. 9.
145.
Id. art. 13(d). States Parties may list their protected cultural property under article
5(b).
146.
Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property, UNESCO, ¶¶ 33–38, http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/
HQ/CLT/pdf/OPERATIONAL_GUIDELINES_EN_FINAL_FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 24,
2020). For example, Greece’s antiquities law protects all ancient moveable and immoveable
monuments and other cultural objects that date to prehistoric, ancient, Byzantine, and PostByzantine times, if they are listed in the National Archive of Monuments. Nomos (3028:2002)
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The UNESCO Convention also has several procedures to protect the
cultural property of countries and territories that are under a temporary or
permanent occupation. The Convention explicitly provides that a State Party
is obligated not only to protect its own cultural property but also to protect
the property of any territories that are under that country’s political leader147
ship. At the time of accession to the Convention, States Parties must consult with the local authorities in territories they occupy with the specific
148
goal of having the Convention apply in these territories. Additionally, the
Convention prohibits the transfer of ownership of cultural property “under
compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a country
149
by a foreign power.”
Under the Convention, UNESCO also has a consulting and dispute resolution role. Any State Party may call on UNESCO to help offer information, education, expert advice, and coordination on cultural property
150
identification and protection. If two States Parties in a cultural property
151
dispute agree, UNESCO may also serve as an arbitrator in the dispute.
In sum, the UNESCO Convention primarily restricts the importation of
152
one State Party’s cultural property by another, and this framework has
been effective. The Convention’s import restrictions have led to the restitution of hundreds of pieces of stolen cultural property that have been de153
tained upon importation. It has also led museums and collectors to change
154
their policies to be more cautious toward acquiring cultural property.

B. Benefits of the UNESCO Convention for Developing Countries
For source countries, which are often developing countries, the
UNESCO Convention provides significant advantages. First, the UNESCO
Convention improves international responses to cultural property theft by
fighting against illicit trade through forced transparency and codified legal
obligations for States Parties. Additionally, the Convention is particularly
devised to benefit source countries, and it sets enforcement obligations in
accordance with each country’s economic means. Finally, the Convention’s
strength grows with its number of States Parties. Although more universal
Gia tin prostasía ton Archaiotíton kai en génei tis Polistikís Klironomiás [On the Protection of
Antiquities And Cultural Heritage in General], EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES
HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2002, A:153 (Greece).
147.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, arts. 12, 22.
148.
Id.
149.
Id. art. 11.
150.
Id. art. 17(1).
151.
Id. art. 17(5). See generally Restitution of Cultural Property: Mediation and Conciliation, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/restitution-of-culturalproperty/mediation-and-conciliation (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
152.
Id. arts. 1, 3, 5(a), 7, 13(a); Veres, supra note 8, at 99.
153.
See infra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
154.
See Cohan, supra note 106, at 48.
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accession would not completely eliminate licit or illicit trade in cultural
155
property, increased Convention membership would help limit the scope
and extent of the trade and impose legal investigatory obligations on States
Parties.
First, the UNESCO Convention improves transparency for the trade in
cultural properties among its signatories. To understand why, look to the
mechanics of the broader art market, which contribute to the illicit trade in
cultural properties. The art auction system, for example, operates on anonymity and opaqueness; at an auction, it is incredibly hard to know what is
156
for sale and who owns what. Moreover, the antiquities black market is a
157
complex system of middlemen and obfuscation. This opacity, coupled
with the frequency of sales transactions, can make identifying that any particular object has been illegally moved from its source country impossible
158
for the final purchaser. The UNESCO Convention seeks to ameliorate this
problem by requiring antique dealers to maintain a register of the price,
provenance (or path of origin), and description of traded cultural proper159
ty.
Second, the Convention, by obliging States Parties to prevent the illicit
import of cultural property into their territories and the illicit trade of cultur160
al property inside their territories, prompts active monitoring of the trade
161
in cultural property. For example, the United States passed the Cultural
Property Implementation Act (“CPIA”) to implement and enforce its
162
UNESCO Convention obligations. Under the CPIA, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) are responsible for stopping illicit cultural property trade at the bor-

155.
Alexander A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical
Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 690, 696 (2007).
156.
See Borodkin, supra note 30, at 386; Carl Schneider, Lecture at University of
Michigan Law School: An Art Collector Looks at Art Law (Mar. 7, 2018).
157.
See Faucon, Kantchev & MacDonald, supra note 2.
158.
Id.
159.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 10(a).
160.
Id. art. 12.
161.
See, e.g., Questions and Answers on the Illegal Import of Cultural Goods Used to
Finance Terrorism, EUROPEAN COMM’N (July 13, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_1954 (describing recent attempts to reinforce
monitoring of free ports and free zones); Boosting National Responses to the Illicit Trade in
Cultural Property, INTERPOL (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.interpol.int/en/News-andEvents/News/2018/Boosting-national-responses-to-the-illicit-trade-in-cultural-property (explaining new monitoring initiatives by countries in Southern Africa); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-716, IRAQI AND SYRIAN CULTURAL PROPERTY: U.S.
GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE SHOULD INCORPORATE ADDITIONAL COLLABORATION
PRACTICES 14 (2017) (describing increased U.S. monitoring of imports to find stolen Iraqi
and Syrian cultural property).
162.
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613
(current through P.L. 115–72).
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163

der. CBP is effectively the front line, with the ability to search, detain, and
164
seize suspect property. ICE handles investigations, including looking into
whether individuals or institutions are illegally importing cultural property
165
into the United States. This system has been effective at catching cultural
property theft. A high profile example is the 2017 case against Hobby Lob166
by for attempting to import stolen Iraqi cultural property. The violation
was uncovered by CBP, investigated by ICE, and then litigated by the Jus167
tice Department.
The United States is not alone in successfully finding illicitly-traded
cultural property and returning it to its country of origin. UNESCO main168
tains a lengthy tab of Convention success stories. Recent returns include
the Netherlands repatriating a mosaic to Cyprus; Kuwait returning a coffin
lid to Egypt; and Germany, Italy, and Switzerland collectively repatriating
169
pre-Colombian archaeological objects to Guatemala.
While nonConvention member countries are of course also capable of repatriating stolen property when they find it, the Convention provides source countries
with actual commitments rather than the mere goodwill of a market country.
Another benefit for developing countries is that accession to the
UNESCO Convention does not impose substantial new costs on them. Article 2 of the UNESCO Convention simply mandates that States Parties “un170
dertake to oppose such practices with the means at their disposal.” While
the ambiguity of the term “means” might allow some States Parties to shirk
their duties, UNESCO’s long list of Convention-brokered success stories
suggests that many states are treating their commitments solemnly. At the
same time, the phrasing of article 2 reflects the reality of the developeddeveloping country dichotomy: Developing countries often do not have the

163.
Id.
164.
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE
COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW ABOUT: WORKS OF ART, COLLECTOR’S PIECES, ANTIQUITIES,
AND OTHER CULTURAL PROPERTY (May 2006), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=714809.
165.
Cultural Property, Art and Antiquities Investigations, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/cultural-art-investigations (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
166.
Complaint, United States v. Four Hundred Fifty Ancient Cuneiform Tablets, CV
17-3980
(E.D.N.Y.
July
5,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pressrelease/file/978096/download.
167.
Id.; see also Michael Goodyear, Hobby Lobby Goes From Arts and Crafts to
Illegal
Antiquities,
CULTURAL
HERITAGE
CRISIS
(July
8,
2017),
https://culturalpropertylawblog.wordpress.com/2017/07/08/hobby-lobby-goes-from-arts-andcrafts-to-illegal-antiquities.
168.
Other Cases of Return or Restitution of Cultural Objects, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/othercases-of-return-or-restitution-of-cultural-objects (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
169.
Id.
170.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 2.
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171

resources to actively patrol their borders, which is one of the reasons for
the existence of the illicit cultural property trade in the first place. The
UNESCO Convention, by calibrating required expenses to each party’s economic “means,” purposefully encourages developing countries to take advantage of its protections by placing a higher burden on wealthier countries.
In addition, it is a sound policy choice to invest in some level of cultural
property protection, for the reasons detailed above in Part II.B, so the
UNESCO Convention requirement just codifies what is in practice benefi172
cial for developing countries. And while there are certainly costs associat173
ed with maintaining a cultural property database, monitoring trade and il174
175
licit activities, and establishing ethical rules and educational initiatives,
these requirements are relatively inexpensive compared to the amount de176
veloped countries spend on protecting cultural property.
Finally, the goal of the UNESCO Convention is that collective action
177
by all the signatories will help solve the problem. There are 140 States
178
Parties to the UNESCO Convention as of December 2019. This leaves
over fifty countries recognized by the United Nations that are not parties to
the Convention. Surprisingly, while there are a few wealthy countries such
as Ireland and Israel that have not accepted the Convention, the vast majority of non-signatories are from the developing world, particularly in the Car179
ibbean, the Pacific, and Africa. As these countries are more likely to be

171.
Susan E. Rice, Speech at University of Michigan Law School: The National Security Implications of Global Poverty (Jan. 30, 2006).
172.
See generally STOP HERITAGE CRIMES. GOOD PRACTICES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2011).
173.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 5.
174.
Id. art. 10.
175.
Id. art. 5.
176.
For example, Hungary spent the most out of any country in the European Union on
the much larger category of “recreation, culture, and religion” in 2016, and this was 3.3% of
its annual GDP. The costs of a database and a set of rules would likely be substantially less.
Government Expenditure on Recreation, Culture and Religion, EUROSTAT (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Government_expenditure_on_
recreation,_culture_and_religion.
177.
Marilyn E. Phelan, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects Confirms a Separate Property Status for Cultural Treasures, 5 JEFFREY S.
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 31, 36 (1998).
178.
1970 Convention States Parties, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/
themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/1970-convention/states-parties (last visited Apr.
24, 2020).
179.
The UN Member States that have not accepted the UNESCO Convention are Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Brunei, Burundi, Capo Verde, Comoros, Congo, Dominica, Eritrea, Fiji, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya,
Kiribati, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Suriname, Thai-
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the source of illicitly traded properties than their market, they actually have
the most to gain from signing onto the UNESCO Convention.

C. Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention for Developing Countries
Because the Convention imposes more stringent obligations on market
180
countries, it is understandable that some would reject the Convention, but
it is less clear why source countries would reject it. However, while the
UNESCO Convention does provide benefits for cultural property protection,
particularly for developing countries, it is not without its problems. The
Convention does not have any enforcement or recovery mechanisms outside
of those its member states choose to implement, it allows state reservations,
and it is not retroactive. These shortcomings could help explain the reluctance of some countries to sign onto the UNESCO Convention, as could
economic reasons and a lack of awareness of the full range of the Convention’s benefits.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the UNESCO Convention is that it
does not create any domestic or international procedures for enforcing its
181
obligations. It does not stipulate a domestic court remedy for cultural
property theft, nor does it create an international enforcement and dispute
resolution system akin to that of other international treaties such as the
182
WTO. However, it is worth considering why a country would sign on to
the UNESCO Convention if it had no desire to intervene in the illicit cultural property trade. Likely, it would not. Indeed, the fact that most major market countries have ratified the UNESCO Convention and have enforced
183
their Convention obligations shows that it has some vitality even without
184
mandatory enforcement mechanisms.
An additional weakness is that States Parties can register reservations to
the Convention at the time of their acceptance, which can create a patchland, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, and Vanuatu. Compare Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and
Transfer
of
Ownership
of
Cultural
Property—States,
UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited Apr. 24,
2020) with Member States, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/member-states (last visited May 13, 2020).
180.
Veres, supra note 8, at 108.
181.
Nina R. Lenzner, Note, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does
the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the
UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 469, 477–78 (1994).
182.
See id. at 479; see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
183.
See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention by
the United States and Other Market Nations 17 (2017), https://www.law.upenn.edu/
live/files/6423-gerstenblith-patty-2017-implementation-of-the-1970 (last visited Apr. 24,
2020).
184.
See Gerstenblith, supra note 99, at 175.
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185

work of varying obligations from state to state. For example, Australia
took a reservation to article 10 of the Convention, which requires states to
186
oblige antique dealers to maintain registers of their items. But while the
ability to register reservations could weaken the protections of the Convention, all reservations to date place limitations only at the outer bounds of the
treaty, like Australia’s reservation, instead of declining to follow its core
187
commitments. Furthermore, treaty reservations are permitted by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties precisely to allow the international
community to maximize the number of signatories to a multilateral treaty
188
without gutting the core of that treaty.
Another reason why source countries have been reluctant to sign onto
189
the UNESCO Convention is because it does not apply retroactively.
While non-retroactivity is standard with international treaties, it is problematic in the context of cultural property because it does not provide any recovery for the large amount of cultural property taken from countries in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries under the aegis of colonialism and impe190
rialism. Still, this does not nullify the benefits of at least having restitution
going forward.
Economics may also factor in. Even though the Convention limits im191
plementation to what is within a country’s economic “means,” costs could
still be a deterrent. Furthermore, the UNESCO Convention does require
States Parties to pay “just compensation” to innocent purchasers, which creates a financial burden on States Parties who are only recovering what was
192
illicitly removed from their territories. While the Convention does provide
assistance from other States Parties to monitor imports and catch illicit

185.
States Parties may, at the time of signing, declare reservations to any treaty that
does not prohibit reservations. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1696) [hereinafter VCLT]; see also Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property, Jan. 10, 1990, 823 U.N.T.S. 23; Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
1970,
UNESCO,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html#RESERVES (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (listing all reservations and declarations made by States Parties to the UNESCO Convention).
186.
Australian Reservations to Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing
the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Jan. 10, 1990, 823
U.N.T.S. 231.
187.
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, supra note 185.
188.
Marko Milanovic & Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, Reservations to Treaties: An Introduction, 24 EURO. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1056 (2013); see also VCLT, supra note 185, at 336–
38.
189.
Gerstenblith, supra note 183, at 26.
190.
Id.
191.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 2.
192.
Cohan, supra note 106, at 44.
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movements of cultural property, there is undoubtedly still a cost for devel193
oping countries.
It is also possible that it is not a fault in the Convention, but rather its
entire purpose, with which a country takes issue. A country’s government
may favor selling cultural property, even knowing that it is not in the longterm interests of the country. For example, in the midst of the ongoing civil
war in Syria, the Assad government is suspected of taking bribes to facilitate the exportation of cultural property, if not actively supporting such ex194
portation. India has also suggested eliminating government-issued licenses for antiquities dealers, although it should be noted that this is highly
195
controversial.
Finally, a lack of awareness of the extent of the benefits provided by the
UNESCO Convention or apathy towards cultural property protection could
also explain some countries’ reluctance to sign onto the Convention, especially if other, more pressing socioeconomic concerns are considered. In developing countries, cultural property protection may not be competitive with
more pressing issues such as food security, ecological problems due to cli196
mate change, financial weakness, or the need for sustainable develop197
ment. Even developed countries often do not prioritize cultural property
protection, as shown by the United States-led coalition’s treatment of cul198
tural property in Iraq during the 2003 invasion and its aftermath. Countries could also simply not be aware of how the benefits of the UNESCO
Convention militate in favor of accession.

D. UNIDROIT Convention Overview
While the UNESCO Convention laid the groundwork for the protection
of designated cultural property by instituting rules that would mitigate its
flow to market countries, the UNIDROIT Convention, adopted in 1995,
supplements the UNESCO Convention by contemplating rules for the return

193.
See id.
194.
Neil Brodie & Isber Sabrine, The Illegal Excavation and Trade of Syrian Cultural
Objects: A View from the Ground, 43 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 74, 79 (2017).
195.
Kate Fitz Gibbon, New Art Law for India?, CULT. PROP. NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://culturalpropertynews.org/new-art-law-for-india.
196.
See Rosamond Hutt, What Are the 10 Biggest Global Challenges?, WORLD ECON.
F. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/what-are-the-10-biggest-globalchallenges.
197.
See, e.g., Priorities of Developing Nations Must Be Centre of Attention, Says India,
ECON. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-andnation/priorities-of-developing-nations-must-be-centre-of-attention-says-india/articleshow/
50556262.cms.
198.
See The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Unnecessary Distraction or Mission-Relevant Priority?, 2 NATO OPEN PUBLICATIONS 1, 5 (2018).
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of any cultural property that unlawfully leaves a source country. The obligation to return cultural property is particularly important to developing
200
countries. The UNIDROIT Convention requires owners to return any cultural property, however obtained, to its country of origin if the law of that
country considers the ownership invalid and that country is a State Party to
201
the Convention. Moreover, the source country is not required to have previously specified the object as cultural property, as it must under the
202
UNESCO Convention.
This expansion is crucial, as cultural property is
203
often privately owned or previously unexcavated, which makes it particularly difficult to repatriate under the UNESCO Convention alone.
The UNIDROIT Convention homes in on cultural property that a market country has failed to stop at the border and return as required under the
country’s UNESCO Convention obligations. In these situations, the
UNIDROIT Convention permits a State Party to request that the importing
state’s domestic courts—or, if the states agree, another court or arbitral pan204
205
el —order the return of any cultural property that was illegally exported.
To succeed, the state claimant must prove a violation of its laws “regulating
the export of cultural objects for the purpose of protecting its cultural herit206
age.”
The UNIDROIT Convention thus expands the scope of cultural property that is protected and provides for judicial recovery of stolen property not
207
present in the UNESCO Convention. This recovery mechanism gives the

199.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10. The UNIDROIT Convention uses the term
“cultural objects” instead of “cultural property,” but its definition is similar to the definition of
the term cultural property that is used in the UNESCO Convention. Id. art. 1 & annex. Cultural objects are defined in the UNIDROIT Convention as “those which, on religious or secular
grounds, are of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and
belong to one of the categories listed in the Annex to this Convention.” Id. art. 2. The Annex
incorporates the language used by the UNESCO Convention to define cultural property. Id.
annex.
200.
Id.
201.
Id. art. 3; see also art. 1 (stating that the Convention applies to claims regarding the
“return of cultural objects removed from the territory of a Contracting State”).
202.
The UNESCO Convention explicitly requires that the cultural property “is specifically designated by each State.” UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 1. The UNIDROIT
Convention does not list any such requirement.
203.
See e.g., Ralph Blumenthal & Tom Mashberg, The Curse of the Outcast Artifact,
N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/arts/design/antiquitymarket-grapples-with-stricter-guidelines-for-gifts.html (noting that 100,000 privately owned
ancient Greek and Roman artifacts lacked adequate provenance, suggesting that the works
were unrecorded or possibly from unexcavated sites).
204.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, art. 8.
205.
Id. art. 3.
206.
Id. art. 1.
207.
See UNIDROIT Secretariat, UNIDROIT Activities, 6 UNIFORM L. REV. 476, 564
(2001).
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UNIDROIT Convention teeth the UNESCO Convention lacks, rather than
208
just relying on States Parties’ own compliance or lack thereof.

E. Benefits of the UNIDROIT Convention for Developing Countries
While the UNESCO Convention focuses primarily on monitoring, the
UNIDROIT Convention is directed at the restitution process. While repatriations have been successfully achieved under the UNESCO Convention,
209
as detailed above, the UNIDROIT Convention attempts to fill gaps left by
the UNESCO Convention by “reduc[ing] illicit traffic in cultural objects by
expanding the rights upon which return of such objects can be sought, and
210
by widening the scope of objects subject to its provisions.”
The
UNIDROIT Convention establishes a restitution procedure in domestic
courts, one with a low burden of proof for countries of origin, and without
reservations, creating a uniform system.
Although the UNIDROIT Convention is not costless, it does attempt to
create processes that will benefit developing countries more than the default
domestic court procedures that would exist without it. Like the UNESCO
Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention does not create an international
dispute resolution body, but, as mentioned above, the UNIDROIT Convention does explicitly authorize member states to petition the courts of other
States Parties for the return of cultural property, and it establishes proce211
dures for this. As discussed more below, if an object is found to be of significant cultural importance to the requesting state, the courts of the recipi212
ent State Party must order its return.
There are no examples of UNIDROIT, or domestic implementing legislation, being directly invoked to successfully recover cultural property.
However, there are examples of UNIDROIT-like procedures being successfully utilized in cultural property recovery. While the United States is not a
State Party to the UNIDROIT Convention, it does have a similar cultural
213
property protection regime through a series of bilateral agreements. The
domestic court procedures established by that system have successfully re-

208.
See Folarin Shyllon, The Recovery of Cultural Objects by African States Through
the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions and the Role of Arbitration, 5 UNIFORM L. REV.
219, 225–26 (2000).
209.
See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
210.
Harold S. Burman, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT): Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft
UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, 34 I.L.M. 1322, 1322 (1995).
211.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3).
212.
Id. Article 5 also includes other cases in which a court shall return the stolen cultural property, but the “significant cultural importance” clause is the broadest category.
213.
See generally Howard N. Spiegler & Yael Weitz, The Ancient World Meets the
Modern World: A Primer on the Restitution of Looted Antiquities, 1 CULTURAL HERITAGE &
ARTS REV. 43 (2010).
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turned cultural property or prompted out of court settlements, highlighting
the potential benefit of the UNIDROIT Convention’s domestic court procedures.
Another benefit of the UNIDROIT Convention is that the burden of
proof in UNIDROIT restitution cases is low. A State Party source country
can require return of an object if its removal is found to significantly impair
the physical preservation of the object or its context . . . the integrity of a complex object . . . the preservation of information of, for
example, a scientific or historical character . . . the traditional or
ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous community, or [if
the State Party] establishes that the object is of significant cultural
215
importance for the requesting state.
What constitutes a “significant” impairment is left undefined by the
216
UNIDROIT Convention, creating a flexible standard to be liberally invoked by source countries. Once this standard is met, the UNIDROIT Convention places a duty on the courts of the state where the possessor is locat217
ed to obtain custody of the object and send it back to its home country.
Thus, the UNIDROIT Convention attempts to diminish the costs for the
country of origin to regain the lost object. In the absence of these
UNIDROIT provisions, some recoveries would be even more costly or even
impossible. By extending the source country’s reach to the possessor’s
courts, the UNIDROIT Convention creates a greater benefit to developing
countries.
The UNIDROIT Convention also prohibits reservations, creating the
possibility for a uniform set of cultural property protection rules across the
218
219
globe. Though the black market in cultural property is global, since
most cultural property is sold to wealthier countries, poorer nations are the
prime beneficiaries of these Convention commitments. Naturally, the
strength of this international policing system grows as more countries sign
on and accede to the Conventions. With a more uniform international sys-

214.
Prominent examples include the Lydian hoard case and the Elmali hoard case. Republic of Turkey v. Metro. Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Republic of
Turkey v. OKS Partners, No. 89-3061-WJS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (D. Mass. June 8,
1994).
215.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3).
216.
See id.
217.
See id. art. 5.
218.
See Alexandra Levine, Note, The Need for Uniform Legal Protection Against Cultural Property Theft: A Final Cry for the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
751, 753 (2011).
219.
Ashleigh Tilley, ISIS, Blood Antiquities, and the International Black Market,
HUMAN SECURITY CTR. 1, (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.hscentre.org/policy-unit/isis-bloodantiquities-international-black-market.
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tem of restitution, deterrence will increase, and the illicit cultural property
220
market will suffer.

F. Shortcomings of the UNIDROIT Convention for
Developing Countries
Although the UNIDROIT Convention does address and correct for
some of the shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention, it is still far from
perfect. Like the UNESCO Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention does
not apply retroactively. Moreover, its statute of limitations restricts recovery, and unknowing possessors of cultural objects are entitled to compensation for returning the objects to their rightful state owners. Its low number of
signatories also undermines its effectiveness.
First, the UNIDROIT Convention, like the UNESCO Convention, is not
retroactive. It applies only to cultural objects that are illegally exported after
221
a state signs onto the Convention. While non-retroactivity is the norm in
international treaties, the inability to recover, or to seek recovery for, the
large amount of cultural property taken through colonialism and imperial222
ism is problematic. But, just as under the UNESCO Convention, this
problem does not nullify the benefits of at least having restitution procedures going forward.
In addition, there are time limits on when claims can be established under the UNIDROIT Convention framework. First, and least objectionable, is
the Convention’s primary statute of limitations, which creates a three-year
window for a claim, starting when the country of origin knows the location
223
of the cultural property and the identity of its possessor. While this statute
of limitations may not be unusual or necessarily overly problematic, the
UNIDROIT Convention also states that claims can (almost) never be
224
brought fifty years after a theft. Thus, if an illicit purchaser successfully
hides the cultural object for this fifty year period, it is no longer be recoverable. The UNIDROIT Convention does carve out an exception for cultural
objects that are an “integral part” of an identified monument or archaeological site, for which only the three-year knowledge statute of limitations ap225
plies, but this is subject to a further carveout that still allows recipient
countries to opt-in to imposing a seventy-five year post-theft limit on

220.
See Eur. Parl. Ass., Report of the Comm. on Culture and Educ. art. I, ¶¶ 3–4, 3d
Sess., Doc. No. 8001 (1998) (“The UNIDROIT Convention can however only develop its full
effect, when the same number of states producing cultural property accede to it as states importing cultural property.”).
221.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, art. 10.
222.
Id.
223.
Id. art. 3.
224.
Id. art. 3(3).
225.
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claims. Furthermore, if an object was exported in the fifty years following
the death of its creator, it is not protected unless an indigenous community
227
created it for traditional or ritual use. This range of limitations on recovery shrinks the breadth of restitution available under the UNIDROIT Convention.
Perhaps the greatest issue, however, is that if the possessor should not
reasonably have known that the object was stolen cultural property, he is
entitled to the court-determined “fair and reasonable compensation” from
228
the requesting state. While not necessarily rising to the object’s purchase
price, this compensation may include the costs of returning the object to its
229
home country. Placing this cost on source countries could dissuade them
230
from pursuing claims.
Still, this language is self-limiting; the amount to be paid in exchange
for the cultural object is only that which is “fair and reasonable,” and this
compensation must only be paid if the possessor did not know or should not
231
have reasonably known that the object was stolen. Courts can also choose
to include a due diligence standard for any award of compensation, which
232
would heighten the possessor’s burden. There is also an alternative to
providing any compensation at all: Allowing the possessor to retain ownership of the re-housed object or to transfer the ownership to someone residing in the object’s home country pursuant to an agreement with the request233
ing country. While this does provide an alternative if countries cannot
afford “fair and reasonable” compensation, it is not primed for cultural
234
property protection, which makes it controversial.
Furthermore, though source countries benefit from the ability to bring
suits, the UNIDROIT Convention does not adequately address the potential235
ly high costs of litigation or arbitration, which may still be prohibitive if
courts allocate even what might be considered a reasonable portion of the
expenses to source countries.
226.
Id. art. 3(5).
227.
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228.
Id. art. 6.
229.
Id. art. 6(4).
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At present, the UNIDROIT Convention’s strength is severely undercut
by its low number of signatories. Unlike the UNESCO Convention, the
UNIDROIT Convention has not been adopted by most of the world. As of
December 2019, only fifty-eight states had signed the Convention, and only
236
forty-eight had implemented it. Both major markets for the cultural property trade, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and source
237
countries, such as Egypt and Turkey, have not signed. But despite this
limitation, the UNIDROIT Convention is a step toward better regulating the
238
cultural property market.

V. Conclusion
This note was an attempt to show the problems arising from the illicit
trade in cultural property and to offer the best available solution. While developing countries’ accession to the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions
alone will not solve the problem of the illicit cultural property trade entirely,
and options for improved future multilateral agreements remain, the protections provided by the Conventions remain an accessible and underutilized
option. Signing onto these Conventions can help states build their tourism
industries, preserve their cultural heritage, and combat crime.
In particular, in the absence of another instrument with stronger protections or another mechanism for the restitution of cultural property, increased
ratification of the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions would grant
source country States Parties the enforcement benefits of the import regulations and domestic court systems of market country States Parties. Furthermore, these Conventions would be better able to combat the illicit trade in
cultural property if their memberships increase. Moreover, accession to
these Conventions does not impose substantial costs on the potential members and the provisions of the Conventions are indeed made to benefit developing countries specifically in many ways. In addition, since the Conventions are not retroactive, there is an incentive for States Parties to sign onto
them sooner rather than later.
Finally, it is worth restating that signing these agreements would not
constrain member states from contemplating alternative mechanisms with
greater protections. Member states could still enter into bilateral treaties

236.
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome,
1995)—Status, supra note 117. The signatories are Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina,
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with more stringent commitments and protection mechanisms. Moreover,
countries could still adopt stricter domestic regulations. For example, Turkey adopted a complete ban on the exportation of any antiquities from the
240
country. And a future or additional international agreement, as contem241
plated above, could be applied in combination with the UNESCO and
UNIDROIT Conventions. Indeed, when it was drafted, the UNIDROIT
Convention was meant to extend the scope of the existing UNESCO Con242
vention, suggesting that future improvements are not outside of the spirit
of these two Conventions. Therefore, accession to these Conventions is a
ready, underutilized option for developing countries to better protect their
cultural property.
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